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NOTES
REDEFINING THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD ACT: BUCKHANNON
BOARD AND CARE HOME AND THE END
OF THE CATALYST THEORY
Richard L. Gibson'
Justice Antonin Scalia, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Hewitt v. Helms,' wrote in dicta:
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially
decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988. A lawsuit
sometimes produces voluntary action by the defendant that
affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a
judgment - e.g., a monetary settlement or a change in conduct
that redresses the plaintiff's grievances. When that occurs, the
plaintiff is deemed to have ? revailed despite the absence of a
formal judgment in his favor.
Fourteen years later, Justice Scalia abandoned this broad model of
"prevailing party" status under Section 1988 to concur with the limited
and formalistic majority opinion of Buckhannon Board and Care Home
v. West Virginia Health and Human Resources.3 The Supreme Court's
rigid definition of "prevailing party" and its firm denial of the catalyst
theory of recovery under the fee-shifting clauses of the Fair Housing
Amendments of 19884 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
sharply restrict the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to bring future civil
rights enforcement actions.6
The judicial struggle over the proper definition of "prevailing party,"
exemplified in Buckhannon, stems from the conflict between the ideal of
preserving the ability of parties to bring suits without the inherent risks
+ J.D. Candidate, 2003, Catholic University of America. The author wishes to thank Anna
H. Roe,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ellis Roe Gibson, and Kevin K. Russell.
482 U.S. 755 (1987).
Id. at 760-61.
See 532 U.S. 598, 610-22 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2000).
See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-10.
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of a "loser pays all" system and the societal need of ensuring the legal
protection of indigent and disadvantaged plaintiffs
The American
judicial preference against fee shifting purports to give parties in a
lawsuit equal standing and to eliminate barriers to poor persons who
initiate lawsuits to protect their rights.'
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently recognized several
exceptions to the preference against fee shifting that give judges the
power to shift fees.' The Court unanimously endorsed shifting fees in
actions where a losing party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons.""' Closely related to this sanction, the Court has

7.

See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46

VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1121 (1993) (arguing that enabling prevailing plaintiffs to recover

legal fees from defendants provides an incentive to follow legal rules). But cf Michael J.
McNamara, Note, Judicial Discretion and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act: What Special Circumstances Render an Award Unjust?, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 320,
321-22 (1982) (asserting that federal courts do not uniformly award attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs unless special circumstances render the award unjust).
&
See, e.g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796) (overturning the
inclusion of attorney's fees as damages by holding that the general practice of the United
States was "in opposition to it"). The American Rule provides that each party must bear
its own attorney's fees. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967). As a result of this practice, most U.S. courts ordinarily do not
award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. See McNamara, supra note 7, at 321-22. On
the other hand, the "loser pays" rule is in effect not only in the English system but also in
most European civil law countries. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and
Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 639-40 (1974). The European rule
arguably acts as a disincentive to litigation because a defeated plaintiff must pay for a
victorious defendant's defense. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 7t8. The historical intent
behind the adoption of the American Rule was to allow all parties equal access to the legal
system. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fightfor Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court, Congress,and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 297 (1990). The purpose of the
American Rule is to encourage the resolution of disputes through litigation by allowing
the opposing parties to provide for the fees charged by their choice of legal representation.
See Court Awarded Attorney's Fees, supra note 8, at 642-44 (presenting the argument that
the American Rule is fair because it does not place on the plaintiff the possibility of paying
legal fees for a successful defendant).
9.
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-263 (1975)
(affirming that the Court grants exceptions in four instances: 1) when allowed by statute;
2) when a losing party willfully disobeys a court order; 3) when a losing party acts in bad
faith; and 4) when the "historic power of equity" would allow the recovery of attorney's
fees). Alyeska Pipeline, however, explicitly limited the power of federal courts to protect
and enforce the private attorney general doctrine. [d. at 263.
10. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129-30
(1974) (arguing that the American Rule is not an absolute bar to fee shifting); see also
Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (holding that a seaman was entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees as damages when he was forced to hire an attorney).
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consistently supported assessing fees against a party who acts in willful
disobedience of a court order.11
The next exception concerns the rights of individuals and the general
public. Historically, the Supreme Court supported awarding fees to a
plaintiff who brings an action as a "private attorney general" that
preserves or recovers a benefit on behalf of the general public. 2 As a
result, federal courts had the authority to justify these awards. 3
However, as a result of the holding in Alyeska Pipeline Service v.
Wilderness Society,14 this doctrine is simply not allowed in federal suits
5
without prior statutory grant.
In the federal courts, explicit fee-shifting statutes provide the final and
most important exception as a result of Alyeska."6 Subsequently, the
Court has ruled that Congress must dictate both "the circumstances
under which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the range of
discretion of the courts."' 7
11. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718; Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S.
399, 426-28 (1923).
12. See generally Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (awarding fees under the Labor
Management Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161 (1939) (awarding fees in litigation regarding a bank failure); Harrison v. Perea, 168
U.S. 311, 325-326 (1897) (awarding attorney's fees in a bankruptcy proceeding); Cent.
Banking & R.R. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 122-24 (same) (1885); see also Carl Cheng,
Comment, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1929 (1985). The private attorney general doctrine is a primary vehicle by which most
individual civil rights are defended and affirmed; as a result, individuals will almost
universally be seen to have standing in such cases to vindicate civil rights provisions.
Cheng, supra at 1938-44.
13. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-58. Judge Skelly Wright expressed the rationale in
support of the private attorney general doctrine in Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), when he wrote that by "acting as private attorneys general, not only
have [plaintiffs] ensured the proper functioning of our system of government, but they
have advanced and protected in a very concrete manner substantial public interests ....
Denying fees might well have deterred [plaintiffs] from undertaking the heavy burden of
this litigation." Id. at 1036. However, the Supreme Court overruled Judge Wright in 1975.
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 241.
14. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
15. Id. at 260-61.
16. Id. at 249-250 (finding that "attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in
absence of a statute"); see also F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974) (same); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717-718 (1967) (same); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450, 452 (1873)
(holding in favor of the American Rule); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306
(1796) (holding that the American Rule may only be modified by statute).
17. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262; see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968) (stating that the Congress provided for recovery of counsel fees "to
encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II
[of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]").
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One of the most important federal laws providing for the award of
attorney's fees to prevailing parties is the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Award Act of 1976 (hereinafter Section 1988)."8 Section 1988 restores
the private attorney general doctrine for enforcement actions under
numerous civil rights statutes by allowing courts the discretion to allow
the prevailing party an award of reasonable attorney's fees as part of the
costs. 19 The FHAA ° and the ADA2 ' adopt language similar to Section
1988 concerning prevailing parties.22 These provisions are the focus of
the Buckhannon case. 3
The central problem of Section 1988 and all fee-shifting statutes that
follow its language concerns the meaning of "prevailing party" under
Section 1988. A key issue that arose was whether a party may be
considered a "prevailing party" when the action is dismissed due to
mootness. 24 Prior to Buckhannon, nearly every circuit adopted the
"catalyst theory" as a baseline for prevailing party status.i The catalyst
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). This provision was passed quickly after the ruling in Alyeska
to restore the rights of individuals to vindicate individual rights in federal court. The
provision, as amended, states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [numerous civil rights
laws], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs,
including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's
jurisdiction.
19. Id. The Act allows an award of attorney's fees for enforcement actions under
provision of sections 42 U.S.C.. §§ 1981-83, 1985, 1986, Title IX of Public Law 92-318, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2000).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000).
22. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ("In any action or administrative proceeding
commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including
litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the
same as a private individual."), and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2000) ("In a civil action under
subsection (a) of this Section, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and costs. The United States
shall be liable for such fees and costs to the same extent as a private person."), with 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may also allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...").
23. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't. of Health & Human Res.,

532 U.S. 598,601 (2001).
24. Id. at 600-01.
25. See generally Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
that for the catalyst test to succeed, the lawsuit must be: "1) a necessary element in
achieving a state's compliance with a statute, and 2) that compliance must be legally
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theory asserts that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees if the lawsuit
alone brings about the desired change in the defendant's conduct.26
The courts that used the catalyst theory to shift fees to defendants
usually required the plaintiff's lawsuit to meet three basic tests. First,
the claim had to be colorable and not frivolous.28 Second, the lawsuit had
to be a substantial factor in changing the defendant's behavior. 29 Finally,
the change in behavior must have provided the plaintiff with some relief
on at least one issue that was litigated.0
required as opposed to gratuitous or voluntary"); Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206,
1224-25 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that the essential question in determining if the catalyst test
applies is whether the suit caused the defendants to take action); Libby v. Ill. High Sch.
Ass'n., 921 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the catalyst test to provisional relief when
the relief granted was determined "on the merits or acted as a catalyst to obtain
concessions" from the opposing party); Associated Builders and Contractors v. Orleans
Parrish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the catalyst test is met
when "1) the suit achieves its goals, and 2) the suit is the cause of the defendant's
corrective action"); Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 625, 627 (3rd Cir. 1989) (stating
that one is a prevailing party if the party is victorious on any material issue that achieved
some kind of relief); Dunn v. Fla. Bar, 889 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 811 (1990) (stating that one is a prevailing party if the defendant engages in
remedial action that moots the dispute after the filing of the suit); Haskell v. Wash.
Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1279 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that an award of attorney's fees is
proper when a party is victorious on a material issue or achieves a substantial amount of
relief through a consent decree or settlement). But see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Buckhannon Court believed that the circuit courts had
embraced the catalyst theory on the basis of ambiguous Supreme Court dicta. See id. at
605. Consequently, it moved to reduce all nuance or doubt from the meaning of certain
phrases in the statute. See id. at 605-06.
26. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-02. The Buckhannon Court overturned this practice
and held that prevailing party status requires a judicially mandated change in the
relationship of the parties either by a judgment on the merits, court-ordered consent
decree, or court-supervised settlement. See id. at 600.
27. See Matthew D. Slater, Comment, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards in Moot
Cases, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 819, 828-32 (1982).

2&

See id.

29. See id.
30. Id. The catalyst theory originated in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433
F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), where the court awarded attorney's fees under a Title VII fee
statute because the plaintiff's lawsuit "acted as a catalyst" to force the defendant to alter
its discriminatory hiring practices. Id. at 429-30. The catalyst theory served as a gap-filler
to justify fee awards in cases where actual or injunctive relief is not offered by the courts,
but the courts find that the plaintiff's lawsuit has legal merit and that the defendant's
change in behavior offers the plaintiff some of the relief sought in the lawsuit. See Slater,
supra note 27, at 820-28 (describing the standards of granting fee awards in moot cases);
see also Luethje v. Peavine Sch. Dist. of Adair County, 872 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1989)
(stating that a plaintiff may prevail if the suit is "causally linked to securing the relief
obtained and... the defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by law)
(quoting J & J Anderson v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985)). The
central question in any catalyst theory case is what constitutes "relief on the merits" in the
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The Supreme Court's ruling in Buckhannon settled a dispute that
began as a claim for reasonable accommodations and ended as a debate
over the meaning of prevailing party.3' Shortly after receiving the orders
to cease operation, Buckhannon Board and Care Home filed suit against
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources claiming
that the self-preservation rule violated both the ADA and the FHAA, as
well as seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and
attorney's fees.32
After nearly a year and a half of discovery, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia ruled against four
motions to dismiss filed by the defendants.33 One month later, the West
Virginia legislature repealed the self-preservation rule, and the district
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for mootness. 34 Plaintiffs
then sought the award of approximately $200,000 in attorney's fees
absence of a formal determination. See Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist. 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989) (stating that "[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party
inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner
which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute").
31. On October 18, 1996, the West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Services issued three orders to the Buckhannon Board and Care Home, an assisted living
facility, to cease operation. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623. West Virginia proceeded
against Buckhannon Board and Care Home for violating a "self-preservation" rule that
prohibited assisted care homes from admitting persons who were unable to exit without
assistance in an emergency. Id.; see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5H-2 (Michie 1998)
(superceded). Three Buckhannon residents, including 102-year-old Dorsey Pierce, could
not walk without assistance to an emergency exit. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623.
32. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 19 F.
Supp. 2d 567 (N.D. W. Va. 1998), cert. granted,530 U.S. 1304 (2000), motion granted, 531
U.S. 1122 (2001), affd, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
33. Id. at 577. The court's determinations on the defendant's motions were as
follows:
[T]his Court finds that plaintiffs have stated a claim for facial discrimination
under the FHAA and for discrimination under the ADA, defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to sufficiently allege these claims is DENIED. Second,
because this Court finds that plaintiffs cannot consistently maintain a claim for
facial discrimination and discriminatory impact, defendants' motion to dismiss
the discriminatory impact claim is GRANTED. Third, defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of capacity to sue is DENIED and plaintiffs are DIRECTED to
substitute the real parties in interest in lieu of the inappropriately named next
friends within ten (10) days following the entry of this order. Fourth, because this
Court finds that the West Virginia Residential Board and Care Home
Association has associational standing, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
standing is DENIED. Next, because this Court finds no reason to dismiss for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, defendants' motion to dismiss on that
ground is DENIED.
Id.
34. See id.; see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
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accrued over the sixteen-month period of the lawsuit.35 However, the

district court denied plaintiffs' efforts to recover attorney's fees under
the fee-shifting provisions of the FHAA and ADA.3 6

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees to the Fourth Circuit and asked
the court to overrule its six-to-five en banc holding in S-1 and S-2 v. State
37
A three-judge panel affirmed
Board of Education of North Carolina.
38
reiterated the Fourth
holding
The
the denial of attorney's fees.

Circuit's stance that the party's receipt of a judgment on the merits, a
consent decree, or a settlement is necessary to qualify for prevailing
party status. 39 As a result, Buckhannon Board and Care Home appealed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split between the
Fourth Circuit and all other circuits regarding the use of the catalyst
theory as a basis for awarding fees.4°

In a five-four decision, delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that the catalyst theory
was an unacceptable basis for the award of attorney's fees under the
FHAA and ADA.4' The Court reached this conclusion by closely
following the reasoning offered in S-1 and S-2 as well as restricting the
definition of "prevailing party." 42

This Note traces the end of the catalyst theory as a means for fee
shifting in claims of equity under the FHAA and ADA. Part I of this
35. See Marcia Coyle, Fee Change Isa Sea-Change, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 2001, at Al.
36. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602 (citing S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21
F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994)).
37. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Resources, No. 99-1424, 2000 WL 42250, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 2000) (unpublished)
(citing S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at *2.
40. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 530 U.S. 1304 (2000); see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602 (stating that the Court
granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement in the courts of appeals regarding the
application of the catalyst test).
41. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
42. See id. at 602; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
prevailing party as "[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the
amount of damages awarded... ").Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred
with the formal definition from Black's Law Dictionaryand suggested that prior Supreme
Court holdings support the insistence upon a judgment, a consent decree, or a settlement
as prerequisites for any prevailing party. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 618-19 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg sharply challenged the narrow construction
of the majority definition of "prevailing party," its abdication of case precedent, and its
denial of congressional intent. See id. at 643-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg challenged the holding as an impediment to the enforcement of federal law
under the private attorney general doctrine. See id. at 623.
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Note discusses the evolving definitions of "prevailing party" and the
emergence of the catalyst theory in Supreme Court and Circuit Court
jurisprudence after the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act was
enacted. Next, Part II of this Note describes the recent Supreme Court
opinion in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources and analyzes the strengths
and weaknesses of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
Finally, Part III of this Note demonstrates how the narrow reasoning of
the majority opinion affects many significant pieces of civil rights
legislation, fails to resolve the key policy issues in a satisfactory manner,
and avoids a nuanced solution that would have better protected the
private attorney general doctrine as well as innocent defendants. This
Note agrees with the dissent that the Court unreasonably departed from
a practice of fee shifting that protected the rights of disadvantaged
clients. Accordingly, the Court should have rejected the Fourth Circuit's
narrow formulation of "prevailing party" and used the "causal link"
catalyst theory analysis, while distributing the risk between the plaintiff
and defendant in future cases (mooted by defendants) under civil rights
legislation.
1. THE TACIT EMBRACE OF CATALYST THEORY: THE COURT'S
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANING OF PREVAILING PARTY

The Supreme Court's treatment of Section 1988(b) over the last
twenty-five years focused upon two catalyst theory issues that are
disputed in Buckhannon: first, defining the meaning of "prevailing"
without a formal judgment under Section 1988 and second, defining
"relief on the merits."43 Two cases, Hanrahanv. Hampton4 and Maher v.
Gagne,45 refine the term "prevailing party" by answering the procedural
question of when in the legal process a party prevails under the federal
fee-shifting provisions. 6 These cases lay a foundation for the first
premise of the catalyst theory-that fees may be awarded to plaintiffs
who prevail without any formal, final judgments on the merits.47 The
Court contemporaneously built upon this foundation with a series of

43. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05 (explaining that certain kinds of judgments,
settlements, and decrees create the 'material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties' necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees, but deciding that "the 'catalyst
theory' falls on the other side of the line from these examples").
44. 446 U.S. 754, 756-58 (1980).
45. 448 U.S. 122, 124, 129 (1980).
46. See Maher, 448 U.S. at 129; Hanrahan,446 U.S. at 756-58.
47. See Slater, supranote 27, at 828-32.
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cases that formulate how a party qualifies for prevailing party status

under Section 1988.4 These cases develop the second major premise of
the catalyst theory -- that plaintiffs may be considered a prevailing party

when there is a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute"
even when the alteration of the relationship moots the lawsuit itself.9
A. When Does a Party Prevail? The Court Refines the Definition
1. PrevailingWithout a FinalJudgment Introduction of the Important
Matter Analysis

In Hanrahanv. Hampton,"' the Court considered at what point in the
litigation a party may claim prevailing status and stated that "a person
may in some circumstances be a 'prevailing party' without having
obtained a 'favorable final judgment following a full trial on the
merits.""'5 By arguing that "it seems clearly to have been the intent of

Congress to permit such an interlocutory award only to a party who has
established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims," the
Court accepted the initial premise of the catalyst theory: that a party may
prevail under Section 1988 by prevailing only on significant issues. 2
However, in a per curiam decision, the Court held that plaintiffs did not

qualify as prevailing parties for merely winning interlocutory orders
affecting discovery or winning reversal and remand of the prior directed
verdicts against them.53 The Court stated that Congress had obviously

contemplated award offers before a final judgment on the merits in some
48. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 121 (1992); Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v.
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4
(1988); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 720 (1987); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61
(1987).
49. See Garland,489 U.S. at 792-93 (arguing that "to be considered a prevailing party
within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the
dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant). See
generally Slater, supra note 27, at 823 (describing the standards of granting fee awards in
moot cases).

50.

446 U.S. 754 (1980).

51. Id. at 756-757 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1558 at 7 (1976) and citing S. REP. No.
94-1011 at 5 (1976)).
52 See id. at 757 ("The Congressional Committee Reports described what were
considered to be appropriate circumstances for such an award by reference to two cases Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375 (1970) .... In each of those cases the party to whom fees were awarded had
established the liability of the opposing party, although final remedial orders had not been
entered.").
53. Id. at 759; see also Bly v. McLeod, 605 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1979).
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cases, but that a party must prevail on an "important matter" in the
course of litigation to be eligible for an award of attorney's fees."
2. PartiesPrevailingThrough Settlement May Claim Attorney's Fees
In Maher v. Gagne, the Court further clarified when a party was
procedurally eligible as a prevailing party for an award of attorney's
fees.55 Significantly, Maher delineated what was only inferred by
Hanrahan:that fees may be awarded to plaintiffs who prevail via private
settlements, consent decrees, or formal judgments on the merits. 6 In an
54. Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 757-58 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011 at 5 (1976)). For
other cases contemplating award offers before the final judgment on the merits, see
Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 985 F.2d 255, 257-58
(6th Cir. 1993) (citing Tex. Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 79091 (1988) for the proposition that Congress meant to permit fee awards where a party
prevails on an "important matter" even if it does not prevail on all issues); Grano v. Barry,
783 F.2d 1104, 1108-10 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that, under Section 1988, the party may be
the "prevailing party before completion of the legal action"); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Erie,
767 F.2d 1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985) (observing that a party may receive attorney's fees
even without a final merits determination); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec. of Public
Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910-17 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that a party may be the "prevailing
party" for the purposes of Section 1988 without prevailing on every legal theory); GerenaValentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that it is sufficient for the
purposes of Section 1988 that the "prevailing party" merely shows a causal connection
between the relief obtained and the litigation for which fees are sought); Doe v. Busbee,
684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982) (declaring that, to be a "prevailing party under
[S]ection 1988, it is unnecessary for the party to prevail on every claim or theory asserted);
Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that the statute does not
require the party to win a judicial determination on the merits to be the "prevailing
party"); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing that the
legislative history of Section 1988 indicates a congressional intent to permit attorney fee
awards even though a party does not obtain a final judicial determination); Am.
Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1.981) (noting that formal
relief is not a prerequisite to obtaining attorney's fees under the statute); Williams v.
Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980) (indicating that a party may be a "prevailing
party" without obtaining complete judicial relief); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319
(4th Cir. 1979) (discerning from Section 1988 a congressional intent to permit an award of
attorney's fees when a party obtains its "objective"); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
279-81 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding it "abundantly clear" that Congress intended to permit an
attorney's fee award when a party vindicates rights but does not necessarily obtain formal
relief).
55. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 128-30 (1980).
56. Id. at 129.
The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than through
litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing in the language of § 1988
conditions the District Court's power to award fees on full litigation of the issues
or on a judicial determination that the plaintiffs rights have been violated.
Moreover, the Senate Report expressly stated that "for purposes of the award of
counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate
rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief."
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opinion joined in part by all of the Justices, the Court held that a party
that prevails through settlement rather than through litigation may still
claim an award of attorney's fees as the "prevailing party" within the
meaning of Section 1988."7 The Maher majority, like the Hanrahan
decision before it, raised the second premise of the catalyst theory by
stating that it could not "accept [the] petitioner's contention that
respondent did not gain sufficient relief through the consent decree to be
'
On the second crucial issue of
considered the prevailing party."58
sufficient relief, though, the Court declined further analysis and simply
upheld the findings of the lower courts.5 9
B. How a Party May Prevail: The Court Develops Theories Based
Around a Requirement of Relief
The Hanrahanand Maher cases clarified the principle that a party may
be considered a prevailing party for fee-shifting purposes without a final
judgment on the merits. 6° However, neither of these cases analyzed the
relationship between the competing parties or considered whether a
change in the behavior of the defendant met the equitable purposes of
Section 1988 and justified shifting fees. The following cases focused
squarely on the second prong of what qualifies as sufficient relief and
closely analyzed the behavior of the parties.

Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976)).
57. Id. at 129. But see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001) (arguing that the court's enforcement
of a consent decree gives the party the prevailing status required under fee-shifting
statutes like Section 1988). It was not accepted law that private settlements or other
mediated arrangements would impart prevailing party status even before the holding in
Buckhannon. Id. at 604 n.7. Obviously, as a result of Buckhannon, only court-ordered
settlements and court-approved consent decrees may qualify under prevailing party
statutes. See id. at 604-05.
58. Maher, 448 U.S. at 129-30. Both decisions during this period assiduously defer to
the judgment of Congress and carefully analyze the legislative histories and particularly
the congressional reports. See id.; Hanrahan,446 U.S. at 757-58. The current Court is not
so deferential to Congress and, at times, is simply dismissive of legislative intent. See
generally Brand, supra note 8, at 307-09 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent shift to
increased reliance on statutory text instead of legislative history); Arthur Stock, Note,
Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretation:How Congress
Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160 (1990) (same).
59. Maher, 448 U.S. at 130 (explaining that "the District Court's contrary finding [of
sufficient relief] was based on its familiarity with the progress of the litigation through the
pleading, discovery, and settlement negotiation stages").
60. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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1.Requirement of Relief-Focus on the Behavior of the Parties
In Hewitt v. Helms,6 ' Justice Scalia ruled that a judicial declaration of a
violation of an inmate's constitutional rights did not qualify as sufficient
relief on the merits to grant the plaintiff prevailing party status under
Section 1988.62 The Court accepted the scope of the definition of
prevailing party status provided by the earlier cases (Hanrahan and
6
Maher) and concentrated on the definition of "relief on the merits."
Consistent with the prior jurisprudence, Justice Scalia held that a plaintiff
must receive "at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can
be said to prevail."' ' However, in dicta, Scalia added that "[a] lawsuit
sometimes produces voluntary action by the defendant that affords the
plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought. . . when that occurs, the
plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed despite the absence of a formal
judgment in his favor." 65 Consequently, this decision tacitly introduced
the central issue of the catalyst theory in mooted cases: whether a
voluntary change in the defendant's behavior (presumably brought on by
the legal process) that provides the plaintiff with the relief sought
6
through the lawsuit is sufficient to justify the award of attorney's fees.
61.

482 U.S. 755 (1987).
Id. at 761 ("In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means.
At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by
the defendant that the judgment produces - the payment of damages, or some specific
performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court but
from the defendant.").
63. Id. at 759-61 (citing Hanrahan,446 U.S. at 757) ("In order to be eligible for
attorney's fees under § 1988, a litigant must be a 'prevailing party'. . . . Respect for
ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his
claim before he can be said to prevail.").
64. Id. at 760.
65. Id. at 760-61. In this case, however, Justice Scalia set forth a litany of reasons why
the plaintiff did not qualify by arguing that the plaintiff received nothing from the
defendant's action:
As a consequence of the present lawsuit, Helms obtained nothing from the
defendants. The only 'relief' he received was the moral satisfaction of knowing
that a federal court concluded that his rights had been violated. The same moral
satisfaction presumably results from any favorable statement of law in an
otherwise unfavorable opinion. There would be no conceivable claim that the
plaintiff had 'prevailed,' for instance, if the District Court in this case had first
decided the question of immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed....
Id. at 761-62.
66. See id.; Luethje v. Peavine Sch. Dist. of Adair County, 872 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir.
1989) (stating that a plaintiff may prevail if the suit was "'causally linked to securing the
relief obtained and.... the defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by
law"') (quoting J & J Anderson v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473, 1475 (10th Cir.
1985). Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970). See
generally Slater, supra note 27, at 828 (describing the standards of granting fee awards in

62
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In this case, unlike Buckhannon, Justice Scalia appeared to acknowledge
that the voluntary change in behavior is enough to qualify as sufficient
relief on the merits. 67
2. Behavior of the Defendant Toward the Plaintiff
Although Rhodes v. Stewart68 appeared to restrict the award of fees
under Section 1988, its focus on defendant's behavior tacitly embraced
the second prong of the catalyst theory analysis.69 The question before
the Court was whether a declaratory judgment in favor of an inmate
plaintiff alleging that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated by guards was sufficient relief to grant the plaintiff prevailing
party status under Section 1988.70 In its per curiam opinion, the Rhodes
Court concentrated almost exclusively on the behavior of the defendant
toward the plaintiff as an indicator of relief on the merits.71 The Court
held that a declaratory judgment "constitute[s] relief, for purposes of
Section 1988, if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant
toward the plaintiff."72 In this case, the declaratory judgment did not

moot cases). The catalyst theory is used in cases where the courts find that the plaintiffs
lawsuit has legal merit and that the defendant's change in behavior offers the plaintiff
some of the relief sought in the lawsuit.
67. Compare Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760-61 (stating that "relief need not be judicially
decreed in order to justify a fee award under [S]ection 1988"), with Buckhannon Bd. &
Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that "our decision that the statute makes plaintiff a 'prevailing party'.
...
was based entirely on language in a House Report... and if this issue were to arise for
the first time today, I doubt that I would agree with that result").
68. 488 U.S. 1 (1988).
69. Id. at 3-4 (stating that a declaratory judgment "will constitute relief, for purposes
of § 1988, if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff").
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 4 ("The case was moot before judgment issued and the judgment therefore
afforded the plaintiffs no relief whatsoever. In the absence of relief, a party cannot meet
the threshold requirement of § 1988 that he prevail, and in consequence he is not entitled
to an award of attorney's fees."). The central issue in Rhodes was whether a declaratory
judgment that failed to affect the behavior of the defendants toward the plaintiffs
constituted relief on the merits under Section 1988. Id. at 1-4. The District Court and the
Court of Appeals in the Rhodes case granted the former inmates attorney's fees under
Section 1988 because they won a declaratory judgment against the prison. Id. at 2-3. The
Supreme Court reversed and found that a declaratory judgment constituted relief for the
purposes of Section 1988 if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the specific defendants
toward the specific plaintiffs. Id. at 4.
72- Id.
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constitute such relief.73 To reach this determination, the opinion relied
heavily on theory of sufficient relief found in Hewitt.74
3. Degree of Success: The BalancingTest of the SignificantIssues
Approach

As the Supreme Court began to weigh carefully the relationship of the
parties in determining relief, it also began to seek a definitive test to

determine how a party (plaintiff or defendant) prevails under Section

1988. 75 In Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent
School District, the Court fused strands of the important matter analysis
briefly explored in cases like Hanrahan with the emphasis placed upon
the parties' behavior and expectations found in Hewitt and Rhodes." In a

unanimous opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court overturned
the Fifth Circuit's holding that a party must prevail on the "central issue"
and held that the test for determining "prevailing party" status requires
that parties "succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit." 77 Justice

73. Id. at 3 (stating that "nothing in our opinion [in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755
(1987)] suggested that the entry of such a judgment in a party's favor automatically
renders that party prevailing under § 1988").
74. See id. at 3-4 (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761) ("The real value of the judicial
pronouncement - what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a 'case or controversy'
rather than an advisory opinion - is the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior
of the defendant toward the plaintiff").
75. In Hensley v. Eckerhart,461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Court defined defendants' rights
of recovery under Section 1988 and found that the degree of a plaintiff's success is the
crucial factor in determining prevailing party status. See id. at 429-31, 440. On the issue
concerning defendants' right of recovery, Justice Powell cited the legislative history to
limit fee shifting for the benefit of prevailing defendants to situations where "the
[plaintiff's] suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the
defendant." Id. at 429 n.2 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976)). With respect to the
definition of prevailing party, the majority opinion insisted that district courts must weigh
the level of the plaintiff's success on a significant issue before granting a fee award. Id. at
440. This approach furthers the idea of judicial discretion and places emphasis on a
nascent significant issues test, which is developed much further in Texas State Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District,489 U.S. 782, 788-92 (1989).
76. See Garland, 489 U.S. at 788-93.
77. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). Citing the Court's holding in Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461, U.S. 424, 433-37 (1983), the Court stated:
[N]o fee award is permissible until the plaintiff has crossed the "statutory
threshold" of prevailing party status. In this regard the [Hensley] Court
indicated that "[a] typical formulation is that the 'plaintiffs may be considered
"prevailing parties" for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any
significant issue in litigation that achieves some of the benefit the parties sought
in bringing the suit."' The Court then went on to establish certain principles to
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O'Connor's opinion traced an effective two-part test for determining
prevailing parties under the meaning of Section 1988.8 First, a plaintiff
must be able to describe a resolution that effectively changes the legal
relationship between the parties.79 Second, the plaintiff must succeed in
"any significant issue in litigation which achieve[s] some of the benefit
As a result, the Garland
the parties sought in bringing the suit."'
opinion supports a catalyst theory of recovery as a proper function of
congressional intent as long as the plaintiff can show both a material
alteration in the relationship with the defendant and a benefit conferred
by this material alteration."
C. Challengingthe Catalyst Theory
Although the Supreme Court never directly confronted the catalyst
theory squarely until Buckhannon, the Court had refined and tacitly
accepted its three basic tenets: a colorable, non-frivolous lawsuit, a link
between the defendant's change in behavior and the lawsuit, and the
requirement that the plaintiff receive sufficient relief as a result of the
defendant's voluntary change in behavior." Until the decision in Farrar

guide the discretion of the lower courts in setting fee awards in cases where
plaintiffs have not achieved complete success.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989); Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978).
7& Garland,489 U.S. at 791-92. The Court explained:
If the plaintiff has succeeded on "any significant issue in litigation which
achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit," the plaintiff has
crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind.... Thus, at a minimum, to be
considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be
able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship
between itself and the defendant.... Beyond this absolute limitation, a technical
victory may be so insignificant, and may be so near the situations addressed in
Hewitt and Rhodes as to be insufficient to support prevailing party status.
Id. (citations omitted).
79. See id. at 792-93.
80. Id. at 791-792 (citing Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 278-79.). The Garland Court also
argued that district courts would have the clear discretion to determine that the tests
adopted have not been satisfied. Id. at 792; see also New York City Unemployed and
Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718, 724 n.4 (2d Cir. 1984); Chicano Police Officers
Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 131 (10th Cir. 1980); Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279.
81. Garland,489 U.S. at 790.
82. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 110-12 (1992) (holding that nominal
damages are enough to justify fee shifting under Section 1988 so long as the suit is
colorable); Garland,489 U.S. at 789-90 (stating that "the plaintiff must be able to point to
a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the
defendant"); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (holding that a declaratory
judgment alone is not enough if it does not affect the relationship of the parties).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 52:207

v. Hobby,83 the lower courts adopted the two-part requirement described
in Garlandand followed the reasoning of Hewitt to justify catalyst theory
fee awards.A4 The Farrardecision cast doubt on the legitimacy of this
approach.8
In Farrarv. Hobby, the Court confronted the issue of whether a party
who had received nominal damages could be considered a prevailing
party for the purposes of Section 1988. 6 In a five-four opinion, the Court
held that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party
under Section 1988 because a judgment for damages in any amount
modifies the defendant's behavior."' However, when a plaintiff recovers
nominal damages only because of a failure to prove an essential element
of the claim for monetary relief, the Court argued that the only
reasonable fee is no fee at ally8
The Court's opinion seemingly restricted the broad scope of the
catalyst theory by arguing that the legislative purpose of Section 1988
allows the refusal of fees to a party who technically prevails.8 9 The Court
83. 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
84. The Garland test was subsequently followed by the Supreme Court and the
majority of the circuit courts. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 887 (1989); Gay
Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293-94 (1st Cir. 2001); Kerin v.
USPS, 218 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2000); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d
541, 544-46 (3d Cir. 1994); W. Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 952 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D.
W. Va. 1996).
85. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
194-95 (2000) (citing disagreement among the circuits as to the validity of the catalyst
theory following Farrar).
86. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 109-14. The plaintiffs sued defendant Hobby and the State
of Texas under Sections 1983 and 1985 of The Civil Rights Act for seventeen million
dollars alleging that the defendants illegally closed a school operated by Farrar and his
son. Id. at 106. The district court awarded only nominal damages and subsequently
attorney's fees as a prevailing party under Section 1988. Id. at 107-09.
87. Id. at 112-13 ("When a court awards nominal damages, it neither enters judgment
for defendant on the merits nor declares the defendant's legal immunity to suit ....
No
material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties occurs until the plaintiff
becomes entitled to enforce judgment, a consent decree, or settlement against the
defendant.").
8& Id. at 118 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)) ("We have
explained that even the prevailing plaintiff may be denied fees if 'special circumstances
would render [the] award unjust."').
89. See id. at 118-20. See generally Laura E. Flenniken, Comment, No More Plain
Meaning: Farrar v. Hobby, 71 DENy. U.L. REV. 477, 478 (1994) (stating that in Farrar,the
Court found it "usually unreasonable to award any attorney's fees where only nominal
damages are awarded"); Joel H. Trotter, Note, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee
Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby, 80 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1443 (1994) (stating that "under
Farrara technical victory renders a plaintiff a prevailing party but will not necessarily
entitle the plaintiff to fees").
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also required a judicial act to compel a material alteration of the legal
relationship.90 However, the Court's decision did not directly affect the
amount of discretion afforded to lower court judges in determining
whether fee shifting was warranted. 9'
Consequently, every circuit court except the Fourth Circuit continued
to award fees to plaintiffs' attorneys based upon the catalyst theory. 92
Though the Fourth Circuit relied upon Farrarv. Hobby to reject the
catalyst theory, the Supreme Court later ruled in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.9' that Farrar
"involved no catalytic effect." 4 In Laidlaw, though, the Court declined

to address directly the "continuing validity of the catalyst theory."
The Court's prior holdings allowed the lower courts a great deal of

latitude in their discretion to award fees where appropriate.9

The

Buckhannon decision altered the ability of courts to exercise such

discretion and injured plaintiffs' chances of recovering fees in the
absence of a final decision on the merits or a court-ordered settlement. 97

90. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 113 (stating that "[n]o material alteration of the legal
relationship between the parties occurs until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a
judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant").

91.

See id. at 115. See generally Trotter, supra note 89, at 1429 (noting that "it is

possible for courts [to] continue to award attorney's fees under [S]ection 1988 in
meritorious catalytic cases").
92. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 602, 602 n.3 (2001) (noting that the Fourth Circuit had explicitly rejected the
catalyst theory and citing cases from the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits recognizing the catalyst theory). The Court did not
choose to cite opinions from the Fifth or D.C. Circuits, but both jurisdictions continued to
apply some form of the catalyst theory after the holding in Farrar. See, e.g., Foreman v.
Dallas County, 193 F.3d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1999).

93.

528 U.S. 167 (2000).

94. Id. at 194.
95. Id. at 195 (stating that the continuing validity of the catalyst theory was not a ripe
issue because the District Court "stayed the time for a petition for attorney's fees until the
time for appeal had expired or, if either party appealed, until the appeal was resolved").
96. See Brand, supranote 8, at 300. See generally Hylton, supra note 7, at 1109.
97. See Brand, supra note 8.
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II. BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME V. WEST VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: ARGUING THAT
PREVAILING PARTY HAS A PLAIN MEANING

A. The Majority Opinion:Holding That the Catalyst Theory Is
Impermissible Groundsfor Recovery Under a PrevailingPartyArgument
In upholding the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court
emphasized that the term "prevailing party" had a plain meaning that
excluded parties gaining relief through the catalyst theory."' The Court
stated that "prevailing party" was a legal term of art and necessarily had
a narrow meaning. 99 As a result, the Court concluded that "prevailing

party" had a clear meaning for the purposes of Section 1988, this
meaning excluded the catalyst theory, and the various policy arguments
behind the use of the catalyst theory were inapplicable.a)
1. Applying the PlainMeaning Argument to Restrict the Broad
Definition of PrevailingParty Status
The majority noted that Buckhannon presented the first opportunity

to examine whether the term "prevailing party" allowed an award of fees
under the catalyst theory.'" The majority opinion briefly described the
development of the law since Section 1988 was enacted and characterized
the relief described in these cases as court-ordered."" The Court argued

98. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 602-04, 610 (2001) (emphasizing that the term "prevailing party" had a plain
meaning that excluded parties gaining relief through the catalyst theory and concluding
that "prevailing party" had a clear meaning for the purposes of Section 1988 that excluded
the catalyst theory).
99. See id. at 603. The Court introduced its definition of "prevailing party" and
stated that Congress adopted a legal term of art with a fixed meaning. Id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that Black's Law Dictionarydefines a prevailing party as a "party in
whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded." Id.
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)). This definition bolstered the
majority's insistence on a judicial act to assure prevailing status. See id.
100. See id. at 610 ("To disregard the clear legislative language and the holdings of our
prior cases on the basis of such policy arguments would be a similar assumption of a
'roving authority."'); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
260 (1975) (arguing that Congress had not "extended any roving authority to the Judiciary
to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them
warranted").
101. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.5 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760
(1987); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 194 (2000)) (stating that "there is language in our cases
supporting both petitioners and respondents, and last Term we observed that it was an
open question here").
102 Id. at 605-06. The Court explained:
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that the catalyst theory, on the other hand, "allows an award where there
is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the
parties."1 3 Furthermore, the Rehnquist opinion concluded that a
voluntary change in conduct alone "lacks the necessary judicial

imprimatur"to justify fee shifting.i°4
To enforce this rejection of the catalyst theory and overcome the
legislative intent of Section 1988, the Court determined that the "plain

language of the statutes" must be reconciled with the Court's previous
holdings. By employing this variation of the plain meaning argument, 1
the Buckhannon Court argued that attorney's fees had never been
awarded "for a nonjudicial alteration of actual circumstances. "''1 As a
result, the majority stated that an acceptance of the catalyst theory would
expand the reach of "prevailing party" beyond Court 'precedent
and thus
'8
"abrogate the 'merit' requirement of [the] prior cases.

2. Avoiding the Policy Arguments and Denying Legislative Intent
The Buckhannon majority next addressed the question of the

legislative intent of Section 1988 and whether Congress anticipated
recovery based upon the catalyst theory. 09 The Court immediately
We have only awarded attorney's fees where the plaintiff has received a
judgment on the merits, or obtained a court-ordered consent decree,-- we have
not awarded attorney's fees where the plaintiff has secured the reversal of a
directed verdict, or acquired a judicial pronouncement that the defendant has
violated the Constitution unaccompanied by "judicial relief'. Never have we
awarded attorney's fees for a nonjudicial "alteration of actual circumstances".
Id. (citations omitted). But see id. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority's opinion that relief must be granted by a judgment).
103. Id. at 605. The Court also noted that the catalyst theory fell below the baseline
test for recovery set forth in Maher, Garland, Rhodes, and Farrar and the statutory
requirements. Id. at 604-05. The Court then used the legislative reports to explain that
"Congess' intent to adopt the 'catalyst theory'... is at best ambiguous as to the availability
of the 'catalyst theory' for awarding attorney's fees". Id. at 607-08.
104. Id. at 605 (noting that a legal alteration in the relationship of the parties carried
out by the court was required by precedent).
105. Id. (agreeing with Justice Scalia's concurrence that the courts of appeals had
"relied upon dicta in.... approving the 'catalyst theory"' as a theory of recovery).
106. See id. at 603 ("This view that a 'prevailing party' is one who has been awarded
some relief by the court can be distilled from our prior cases."). But see Flenniken, supra
note 89, at 502-04 (arguing that the Court's interpretation of Section 1988 betrays the plain
meaning of the statute and congressional intent).
107. Id. at 606 (countering the dissent's catalytic argument and asserting that an
expansion upon precedent would lead to unjustified fee awards where the plaintiffs' case
was colorable and nothing more).

108. Id.
109. Id. at 607.
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dismissed the legislative history argument by stating flatly that any
analysis of the legislative history could not outweigh the clear meaning of
"prevailing party."
Next, the Court briefly analyzed key portions of
the House and Senate reports and determined that the legislative history
was too ambiguous to be used to alter the definition of prevailing party."'
The Court then analyzed three of the key policy issues raised by the
petitioners: whether defendants would intentionally moot cases to avoid
fee awards; whether plaintiffs would be discouraged from bringing suits
for equitable relief because of expense; and whether a catalyst theory
hearing would be burdensome."'
First, the Buckhannon majority
dismissed without much consideration the concerns that defendants
would moot cases or plaintiffs would be prevented from bringing cases
because these concerns were "entirely speculative and unsupported by
any empirical evidence.""' 3 Next, the Court entertained the notion that
district courts could perform "catalyst theory hearing[s]" but rejected this
notion as too burdensome and not readily administered." 4 Finally, the
majority opinion returned to its bedrock argument that the term
"prevailing party" was so clear and incontrovertible that these policy
115
considerations did not need to be decided in this case.
B. The Concurrence:Confronting the Policy Arguments Directly
Justice Scalia wrote his concurring opinion to support the majority's
definition of "prevailing party" and to refute directly the policy
arguments of the dissenting opinion.' Scalia's argument addressed three
primary issues and further developed the arguments of the majority
opinion: the historical constancy of the meaning of "prevailing party,"
110. See id. The Court reluctantly presented the argument that the legislative history
of Section 1988 supports the catalyst theory by noting that "[w]e doubt that legislative
history could overcome what we think is the rather clear meaning of 'prevailing party' the term actually used in the statute." See id. However, because the Court resorted to the
legislative history of Section 1988 in Garland,489 U.S. at 790, and Hanrahan,446 U.S. at
756-57, it analyzed it here. See id.
111. Id. (stating that "the legislative history cited by petitioners is at best ambiguous as
to the availability of the 'catalyst theory' for awarding attorney's fees"). See generally
Stock, supra note 58.
112. Id. at 608.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 609-10 (stating that the district courts are capable of handling such review
but that such an interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes would spawn a second
litigation).
115. Id. at 610 (arguing that disregarding the clear meaning would extend to the
judiciary a "roving authority").
116. See id. at 610-22 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the unreliability of his own dicta in Hewitt, and the policy interests of
defendants sued under these statutes. 117 The concurring opinion devoted
the first part of its argument to demonstrating the consistent meaning of
"prevailing party" under the American Rule." 8 According to Justice
Scalia, the traditional meaning of prevailing party was reasonably clear
because "prevailing party" has always "meant the party that wins the suit
or obtains a finding (or an admission) of liability.1 .9
The opinion continued with an analysis of the policy considerations
behind allowing plaintiffs to recover under the catalyst theory. l0 Justice
Scalia strongly disagreed that the legislative history cited by the dissent
supported the idea that Congress was aware of the catalyst theory as
early as 1970.121 The concurring opinion then argued that awarding fees

to plaintiffs under the catalyst theory "causes the law to be the very
instrument of wrong," which is more reprehensible than denying fees to2
worthy plaintiffs because it would likely harm innocent defendants.
The concurring opinion concluded with a renunciation of Justice Scalia's
own dicta in Hewitt v. Helms. 23 Justice Scalia now argued that his
117. See id.
11& See id. at 610-16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing cases using the term "prevailing
party" dating as far back as 1884).
119. Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia opened by discussing the history
of using "prevailing party" in the context of awarding costs rather than attorney's fees. Id.
at 611 (Scalia, J., concurring). He stated that, prior to the enaction of the federal fee
shifting statutes, there were no cases that "[regarded] as the prevailing party a litigant who
left the courthouse empty-handed." Id. at 613-14 (Scalia, J., concurring). Furthermore, he
asserted that, prior to the enaction of the fee-shifting statutes, prevailing party was "[n]ot
the party that ultimately gets his way because his adversary dies before the suit comes to
judgment; not the party that gets his way because circumstances so change that a victory
on the legal point for the other side turns out to be a practical victory for him; and not the
party that gets his way because the other side ceases (for whatever reason) its offensive
conduct." Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia concluded that when words
have "acquired a specialized meaning in the legal context," they must be construed by
their legal meaning. Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 616-20 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the dissent's interpretation of
"prevailing party" by stating that it produces "an award of attorney's fees when the merits
of the plaintiff's case remain unresolved - when, for all one knows, the defendant only
'abandon[s] the fray' because the cost of litigation - either financial or in terms of public
relations - would be too great").
121. See id. at 617 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "legislative history from only
one legislative chamber - and consisting of the citation of Courts of Appeals cases, that
surely few if any Members of Congress read - is virtually worthless").
122. See id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 621-22 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Deferring to our colleagues' own error is
bad enough; but enshrining the error that we ourselves have improvidently suggested and
blaming it on the near-unanimous judgment of our colleagues would surely be unworthy.
Informing the Courts of Appeals that our ill-considered dicta have misled them displays, it
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argument was both misplaced and misinterpreted by the circuit courts
and that the Supreme Court has an affirmative duty to correct this
error.'2 4 Unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist's succinct dismissal of the policy
issues behind the catalyst theory, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
centered squarely on policy arguments that promoted the defendant's

interests in the course of civil rights litigation. 12
C. The Dissent: Rejecting the Plain MeaningArgument and Emphasizing
the Policy Considerationsof PrevailingParty Status
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice
Breyer, argued in the dissenting opinion that the Court's definition of
"prevailing party" allows defendants to escape the statutory obligation to

pay fees, damages the prospects of indigent plaintiffs, hinders the private
attorney general doctrine in federal cases, and shrinks the enforcement
mechanisms of federal civil rights legislation. 26 Ginsburg's argument

repudiated the "anemic" definition of "prevailing party" supported by
the majority, demonstrated the links between clear legislative purpose
and congressional acceptance of the catalyst theory of recovery, and

promoted the policies in2 7favor of plaintiffs who experience hardship

under the American Rule.
The dissenting opinion strongly questioned the efficacy of such a
narrow definition of "prevailing party," particularly in light of prior
Supreme Court holdings like Maher v. Gagne that vary from the
Buckhannon majority's conception of court-ordered relief.' 1 Justice
Ginsburg asserted that plain meaning is found in the legislative history of
Section 1988, which grants prevailing party status to parties who
seems to me, not 'disrespect', but a most becoming (and well-deserved) humility."). Scalia
essentially washes his hands of Hewitt. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 ("In all civil
litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies
not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the
judgment produces - the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the
termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the
defendant.").
124. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. See id. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the catalyst theory in actuality
"harms the less well-heeled" [by] putting pressure on them to avoid the risk of massive
fees by abandoning a solidly defensible case early in litigation").
126. See id. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. See id.
12& See id. at 629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129
(1980)) (stating that "[niothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the District Court's
power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the
plaintiffs rights have been violated").
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"vindicate rights through ...judgment or without formally obtaining
relief."12 9 Ginsburg challenged the concurring opinion's policy arguments
by maintaining that the catalyst rule not only aids poorer plaintiffs but
also encourages defendants to negotiate settlements.1" Finally, the
dissent concluded that the Court failed to provide "a cogent explanation"
for overturning the prevailing judgment in nearly every circuit court."'

III. A DEPARTURE FROM PRAGMATISM: THE OUTCOME OF
BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME V. WEST VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OFHEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court asserted its power to define acts of
Congress and restrained the ability of the circuit courts to award fees to
worthy plaintiffs. 3 2 By embracing the analysis of the Fourth Circuit, the

Court renounced the discretion given to courts by the holdings of its
prior cases."'

The majority opinion neglected to confront the crucial

policy issues and diminished the ability of indigent plaintiffs to bring34
actions as private attorneys general and recover fees in federal courts.'
The Buckhannon opinion unquestionably protects innocent defendants
from absorbing fees in cases with legal merit where a plaintiff may not

have prevailed under a final judgment.'35 However, this formalist
requirement of a "judicial imprimatur" completely hinders pragmatic,
reasonable analyses of the behavior of the parties in mooted cases and

129. Id. at 637 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5).
130. Id. at 639 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "one could urge that the catalyst
rule may lead defendants promptly to comply with the law's requirements: the longer the
litigation, the larger the fees"); see also Hylton, supra note 7, at 1121 (arguing that "fee
shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs enhances both incentives to comply with legal rules
and incentives to settle disputes").
131. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 643-44 (stating that the majority's narrow construction is
"unsupported by precedent and unaided by history or logic"). To refute Justice Scalia's
insistence that the catalyst theory was a rare aberration and that his dicta unfairly misled
the circuits, the dissent offered twelve cases that employed the catalyst theory before
Hewitt. Id. at 626 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Ginsburg cited nine
courts of appeals that "reaffirmed their own consistently held interpretation of the term
'prevail"' after "the Fourth Circuit, en banc, dividing six-to-five, broke ranks with its sister
courts" to declare that "a plaintiff could not become a 'prevailing party' without an
enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement." Id. at 626-27 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F. 3d 49,57 (1994)).
132. Id. at 605-06 (stating that the use of catalyst theory under prevailing party statutes
must be reconciled with prior Supreme Court holdings).
133. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
134. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 605.
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will likely serve as a deterrent to suits in equity under civil rights acts.'36
By refusing to confront this question, opting instead to cancel the catalyst
theory, the majority merely erased all intended benefits for plaintiffs,
provided defendants with the incentive to deliberately moot cases to
avoid fee awards, and removed equitable remedies from the hands of
highly qualified judges.'37
A. The Majority Should Have Confronted the Crucial Policy Issue
Expressed in the Legislative History

The Buckhannon Court argued that the legislative intent of Section
1988 was ambiguous and not useful in resolving whether Congress meant
to endorse plaintiff-friendly fee awards under a catalyst theory.'98 The

struggle to pass Section 1988 generally centered on the policy argument
of whether the benefit to disadvantaged plaintiffs of upholding the
private attorney general principle outweighed the likely injury to

innocent defendants under a catalyst theory of recovery. 39
Both the House and Senate reports indicated a fairly clear vision of

restoring the private attorney general doctrine to federal lawsuits.' 4° In
particular, the House report strongly favored both the needs of indigent
plaintiffs and the importance of vindicating individual civil rights over
the potentiality of harm to innocent defendants. 14' At the same time, the
legislative histories concerning Section 1988 were silent as to whether
Congress explicitly intended to permit fee awards under the catalyst

theory.'42 The House Report clearly indicated that fees may be awarded
136. Id. at 634-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

137. See id. at 640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("And Congress assigned responsibility

for awarding fees not to automatons unable to recognize extortionists, but to judges
expected and authorized to exercise discretion.").
13& Id. at 639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that "[p]articularly in view of the
'American Rule' that attorney's fees will not be awarded absent 'explicit statutory
authority' such legislative history is clearly insufficient to alter the accepted meaning of

the statutory term").
139. See 122 CONG. REC. 16251 (1976) (stating the need for the bill due to the
"staggering costs of litigation"); see also 122 CONG. REC. 16429 (1976) (arguing that the
bill takes care of a "small group of activist attorneys"). See generally 122 CONG. REC.
32,394-32,397 (1976) (discussing the bill's application to other civil rights laws and the
relative importance of speedy passage of the bill); 122 CONG. REC. 31,829-31,831 (1976)
(discussing the bill's potential to further enrich plaintiffs' attorneys at the expense of
defendants).
140. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 3 (1976); see also 121 CONG. REC. 26,806 (1975)
(arguing that the bill remedies the harm caused by the decision in Alyeska PipelineService
Co. v. Wildnerness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
141. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 1-7 (1976).
142 See id. at 3.
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if a defendant changed his behavior.1 43 Furthermore, as the dissenting
opinion in Buckhannon pointed out, both the House and Senate Reports
cited to Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,'" suggesting that
both chambers had at least a nascent awareness of the catalyst theory."'
In dismissing the legislative history as ambiguous, both the majority
and the concurrence implicitly relied on the fact that the catalyst theory
was not a widespread means of fee shifting while Section 1988 was being
debated and approved by Congress.' 46 However, both of these opinions
failed to examine the common law background of the passage of the feeshifting provisions of the ADA and FHAA. 47 At this point in time,
courts did use the catalyst theory to support fee shifting under civil rights
provisions.1" Therefore, it is possible that Congress
embraced these tests
49
when it adopted the newer fee-shifting provisions.1

143. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976) (stating that even if the defendant
voluntarily stops the unlawful activity, "[a] court should still award fees even though it
might conclude, as a matter of equity, that no formal relief, such as an injunction, is
needed").
144. 433 F. 2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
145. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 637 n.11 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia took issue with
Justice Ginsburg's reading of Parham and argued that the dissent incorrectly characterized
Parham, and, in fact, the majority opinion in Buckhannon approved the result in Parham.
Id. at 616, 617 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring).
146. See id. at 602, 618-19; see also Trotter, supra note 89, at 1433-34 (explaining that
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), was the first case to
employ the catalyst theory of recovery, and its decision was cited by Congress in reports
concerning Section 1988).
147. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 1-7 (1976).
148. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1991)
(declaring that a party prevails when the relief sought is achieved or when there is a causal
link between the lawsuit and the extra-judicial relief obtained); see also Associated
Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir.
1990) (explaining that a party prevails when "its ends are accomplished"); Grano v. Barry,
783 F.2d 1104, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that a party prevails even if the action halts
due to mootness); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910-17
(3d Cir. 1985) (asserting that a party prevails when a portion of the benefit sought is
achieved).
149. In deciding whether Section 1988 applied in this instance, the Buckhannon Court
examined the plain language of the statute along with the legislative intent of the act.
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605-08. The majority chose to disregard legislative histories and
instead relied primarily on a plain meaning argument to determine that the catalyst theory
was an inappropriate means of recovery under the fee-shifting provisions of the ADA and
FHAA. Id. See generally Stock, supra note 58 (discussing Justice Scalia's dismissal of the
importance of legislative history). The majority's reliance on a plain meaning argument
provided the Court with the legal rationale to overturn the practices of the circuits and to
limit the scope of congressional civil rights enforcement measures. See Buckhannon, 532
U.S. at 598-99, 607.
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B. The Majority Should Have Adopted a Per Se Test To Allow a Limited
Use of the Catalyst Theory

By defining "prevailing party" in such a narrow way, the majority
opinion removed the need for fact-based judicial discretion, important
matters tests, or detailed analyses of the behavior of the parties."" The
dissent powerfully argued that the Court failed to establish principled
and compelling reasons for overturning the reliable practice of nearly

every circuit court. 5' The majority opinion should have established an
objective test for introducing a catalytic theory of recovery in cases that
are mooted by the actions of either party.
The Buckhannon Court rejected the consideration of per se rules to
provide a framework for catalyst theory issues."' The appellants in the
case offered three basic requirements that followed the Garlandtest and,
with additional procedural modifications, would potentially allow courts
to reach fair solutions while limiting purely discretionary awards through
a broad application of the catalyst theory.'53 The first requirement
demanded that the suit have "legal merit" based on the ability of the
plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.'54 The majority opinion argued that this
requirement was "not the type of legal merit that our prior decisions,
based upon plain language and congressional intent, have found
necessary."' 55 However, it is almost certain that a determination of the
kind of legal merit described by the majority opinion would require a

150. See McNamara, supra note 7, at 323 (discussing a number of tests used to apply
the catalyst theory); see also Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489
U.S. 782, 792-94 (1989) (looking for a material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute before applying
the catalyst theory); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 767 (1987) (retaining the discretionary
powers of lower court judges in fee-shifting matters).
151. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627, 643-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 609 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 28); see also
Slater, supra note 27, at 828. Slater offers a rather permissive three-part test that demands
that the plaintiff "demonstrate that he actually obtained relief; the relief must in some way
have been the result of the lawsuit; and the suit must have concerned a legally cognizable
civil rights claim." Slater, supra note 27, at 828 (footnote omitted).
153. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26-29, Buckhannon Board &
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (No. 991848).
154. See id. at 27 (arguing that the case must be able to survive a directed verdict or a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim).
155. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. The majority believed that "[e]ven under a limited
form of the 'catalyst theory,' a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees" if the legal merit test
was based upon the FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) test. Id.
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Consequently, it is more sensible to use a
burdensome mini-hearing.'
simple, uniform standard, such as the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard,
as a prerequisite or baseline and provide defendants with other
procedural protections, such as those described in Part III.C., to prevent
a broad application of the catalyst theory.'
Second, the plaintiff must show that some grievance has been
redressed by the defendant's actions.'58 This requirement would focus
upon a material alteration of the parties' legal relationship that provides
the plaintiff with some of the relief sought.159 The majority opinion
supported this requirement, but only in the sense that enforceable6 °
judgments and consent decrees create the material alteration and relief.'
The majority's insistence on a judicial imprimatur here is misguided for
the reason set forth by Justice Scalia in Hewitt: that actual relief means
from the other party rather than winning formal legal
getting something
• 161
pronouncements.
Finally, the plaintiff must show a causal link between the plaintiff's suit
and the defendant's actions. 162 This test was untenable to the majority of
the Court who argued that this was "clearly not a formula for 'ready

156. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, at 28) (stating that "[a]mong other things a 'catalyst theory' hearing would require
analysis of the defendant's subjective motivations in changing its conduct, an analysis that
'will likely depend on a highly factbound inquiry and may turn on reasonable inferences
from the nature and timing of the defendant's change in conduct').
157. FED. R. Cv.P. 12(b)(6) (stating that the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted may be made at motion at the option of the pleader); see also
infra Part III.C.
158. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 28 (suggesting a significant
issues test).
159. See, e.g., Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
790-93 (1989).
160. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001).
161. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987). In defining "prevailing party", Justice
Scalia stated in Hewitt:
Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant. This is no less true
of a declaratory judgment suit than of any other action. The real value of the
judicial pronouncement... is in the settling of some dispute which affects the
behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. The "equivalency" doctrine is
simply an acknowledgment of the primacy of the redress over the means by
which it is obtained. If the defendant, under the pressure of the lawsuit, pays
over a money claim before the judicial judgment is pronounced, the plaintiff has
"prevailed" in his suit, because he has obtained the substance of what he sought.

Id.
162. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 28 (asserting both a significant
issues test and the pragmatic vision of recovery set forth in dicta by Justice Scalia in
Hewitt).
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administrability. ' '' .3 In almost the same sentence, though, the Court
expressed its confidence in "the ability of district courts to perform the
nuanced 'three thresholds' tests."'16 The Court should have continued to
trust the ability of the lower courts to fashion fair solutions.
C. ProtectingInnocent Defendants Procedurally- Distributingthe Risk
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion stated that because the harm caused
to innocent defendants was a greater evil than the deterrence of indigent
plaintiffs, denying a catalyst theory of fee recovery was entirely
justified.' 6' However, distributing the procedural risks between plaintiffs
and defendants could have allayed this potential harm without destroying
the benefit provided by Congress to indigent plaintiffs and allowed the
lower courts to continue using the catalyst theory.' 66
The first procedural modification proposed to catalyst theory recovery
is a fairly mechanical timing requirement. In this scenario, the courts
should require defendants to bear the risk of catalyst theory analysis in
cases where the defendant pursues the case for more than a year and
then moots the case through voluntary action. The solution would
effectively combat the strategy of mooting a case to avoid paying fees
and costs and encourage quicker settlements. 67
The use of catalyst theory to recover fees in mooted cases is not a
common situation, but denying the catalyst theory in full will remove
incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring these cases on behalf of
indigent clients. Thus, the second procedural requirement should be a
fees mini-hearing pursuant to the clear intent of Congress to preserve the
private attorney general doctrine under Section 1988.6
On the

163. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001) (citation omitted).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 618 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that "[t]here is all the difference in
the world between a rule that denies the extraordinary boon of attorney's fees to some
plaintiffs... [and] exacting the payment of attorney's fees to the extortionist").
166. Even sworn opponents of the proposed Section 1988, such as Senator Helms,
sought to propose procedural remedies that would allow defendants to be considered
prevailing parties rather than prohibiting any possibility of fee shifting. See 122 CONG.
REC. 32,394 (1976) (discussing amendments that would allow defendants to recover as
prevailing parties for bad faith, vexatious, or frivolous lawsuits).
167. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 636 n.10 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[g]iven
the protection furnished by the catalyst rule, aggrieved individuals were not left to worry,
and wrongdoers were not led to believe, that strategic maneuvers by defendants might
succeed in averting a fee award").
16& See id. at 640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Morris v. W. Palm Beach, 194
F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999)) (arguing that this procedural requirement might save
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defendant's behalf, the Court should allow a defendant to recover
reasonable attorney's fees if a plaintiff pursues a fee award under the
catalyst theory and fails in such a hearing. Thus, if a plaintiff is not able
to prove that the claim had legal merit, that some grievance had been
redressed by actions of the defendant, and that the defendant's action
was causally linked to the plaintiff's lawsuit, then the plaintiff would have
to pay for all fees incurred by the defendant as a result of preparing for
this mini-hearing procedure.' 69
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court in Buckhannon required a "judicial imprimatur," which
effectively ended the practice of awarding fees under the catalyst
theory. 7 ° As a result, the catalyst theory is no longer a viable tool for
attorneys suing under civil rights statutes that use "prevailing party"
language. By upholding a functional and fair test and distributing risks
between the plaintiff and defendant, the Court could have provided
equitable restrictions on the use of the catalyst theory. Instead, the
Court's rigid definition of "prevailing party" makes it far more difficult
for future plaintiffs and their attorneys to enforce individual freedoms
under federal civil rights legislation.

judicial
through
169.
170.

resources by encouraging "plaintiffs to discontinue litigation after receiving
the defendant's acquiescence the remedy initially sought").
See generally McNamara, supra note 7; Hylton, supra note 7.
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 641.
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